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Abstract 
The use of independent committees for the setting of interest rates, such as the Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC) at the Bank of England, is quickly becoming the norm in developed 
economies. In this paper we examine the issue of appointing external members (members 
who are outside the staff of the central bank) to these committees. We construct a model of 
MPC voting behaviour, and show that members who begin voting for similar interest rates 
should not systematically diverge from each other at any future point. However, econometric 
results in fact show that external members initially vote in line with internal members, but 
after a year, begin voting for substantially lower interest rates. The robustness of this effect to 
including member fixed effects provides strong evidence that externals behave differently 
from internals because of institutional differences between the groups, and not some 
unobserved heterogeneity. We then examine whether career concerns can explain these 
findings, and conclude that they cannot. 
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1 Introduction
In recent years, many central banks, including those in Australia, New Zealand, the UK, and
the EU have turned over authority for setting interest rates to independent committees in order
to limit politiciansability to manipulate interest rates, and to allow trained experts to conduct
monetary policy rather than less specialized politicians. While there is widespread agreement1
on the advantages of independent committees, numerous important issues about their optimal
structure are still unresolved. One such matter is whether people from outside the world of
central banking should have places on the committee. The issue is of direct relevance. In the
UK the Chancellor of the Exchequer directly appoints four of the nine members of the Monetary
Policy Committee (MPC) from outside the Bank of Englandthe so called external members
and replaces or reappoints them every three years. The Reserve Bank of Australias 9-person
committee responsible for monetary policy decisions (Reserve Bank Board) contains 6 external
members. By contrast, all members of the Federal Reserves Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) are employed in senior positions by either the Board of Governors or the regional
Federal Reserve Banks, and the European Central Bank has a twenty-one person committee
with no external members, although some have called for the introduction of a smaller committee
including external members2 .
As the MPC is the primary example of a committee divided between internal and external
members, studying its membersvoting behaviour is a natural starting point to address whether
committees should include outsiders3 . Previous research, discussed more fully below, has noted
di¤erent voting patterns among externals and internals. In particular, externals vote for lower
interest rates and dissent more than internals. While noting the same patterns, this paper
moves substantially beyond these descriptive observations and provides three major and novel
results. First, external members vote for substantially lower interest rates and behave more
heterogeneously than internals even after controlling for occupation, education, age, committee
composition, and economic conditions. Thus, external members behave di¤erently from internals
not because of di¤erent backgrounds, but simply because they are external, meaning something
inherent to the institution causes voting di¤erences4 . Another way of stating this result is that
appointing people from outside central banking to the committee does not change voting as such;
of greater importance is whether these outsiders are given managerial responsibilities and future
career prospects in the Bank. For example, in Brazil and Sweden outsiders are appointed to
the monetary policy making committees, but on appointment these outsiders become members
of central bank sta¤. Our results suggest this design is fundamentally di¤erent from the UKs
practice of employing outsiders only for their MPC duties.
Our next nding is also our most important one: the di¤erence in voting level arises entirely
from experienced committee members. When they rst join the committee, internals and exter-
nals are indistinguishable in their voting levels; after serving for a year, externals begin voting
for lower interest rates. A voting model in which all members are rational, Bayesian updaters
maximizing the same objective function predicts that committee members in initial agreement
on the correct interest rate will not diverge from each other at any future point. The fact
that our econometric ndings contradict this pattern means we can rule out the possibility that
1See, for example, experimental studies such as Blinder and Morgan (2005) and Lombardelli et al (2005), or
theoretical such as Gerlach-Kristen (2006).
2See Wyplosz and Artus (2002).
3The Reserve Bank of Australia has only recently started to publish minutes of their Reserve Bank Board
meetings and no voting records are published.
4To take one example, Charles Bean and Steve Nickell were both economics professors at the London School
of Economics prior to the formers appointment as an internal and the latters as an external.
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internals and externals both exhibit ideal behaviour5 . Thus, either internals or externals create
agency costs for society since one of the two groups fails to behave ideally. To our knowledge,
this paper is the rst to point out the normative implications of the MPC voting record.
If internal or external members depart from ideal behaviour, the next obvious question is
what incentives drive voting. Our last nding is that there is no evidence of externalsbehaving
di¤erently from internals because of signalling. This result is interesting in light of the emphasis
placed on signalling in several recent papers on committee voting (for example Levy (2007) and
Meade and Stasavage (2008)). First, academic and non-academic members behave equivalently
in a statistically sense. Second, members who vote knowing reappointment is possible do not
di¤er from members who believe reappointment is not possible.
Although these ndings do not in themselves provide a complete answer as to whether exter-
nals should have a voice in monetary policy making, they do highlight important considerations
that governments should keep in mind when designing committees. First, internal and external
members do di¤er markedly in their behaviour, so there are real e¤ects of including both types on
a committee. Second, because of their greater voting volatility, externals reduce social welfare
under a standard concave loss function. Finally, in the UK at least, either one or both of the
groups behaves contrary to the governments wishes. Unfortunately, the paper does not provide
a statistical test of which one does. While it may be tempting to suspect that it is the externals
because of their downward voting trend, internals could just as well hold excessively rigid views
and fail to adjust their beliefs about correct monetary policy making. We do not view the
incompleteness of this answer as a limitation, but rather as a stimulus for building and testing
models of committee decision making to account for the results, and a warning to governments
to not to assume ideal behaviour from those charged with conducting monetary policy.
In the next section we provide details about the history and structure of the MPC and review
previous research in this area. The third section constructs a simple model of ideal committee
voting. The fourth section describes the voting data and the econometric model before presenting
empirical ndings that contradict the ideal voting model. The fth section presents evidence
against signalling incentives among external members, and discusses implications for committee
design. The nal section concludes.
2 MPC Background and Literature Review
Up until 1997 the Chancellor of the Exchequer (the Minister in charge of the Treasury Depart-
ment) had sole responsibility for setting interest rates in the UK. One of Gordon Browns rst
actions on becoming Chancellor in the Blair government was to set up an independent com-
mittee for setting interest rates in order to make monetary policy less arbitrary and susceptible
to election cycles. The MPC rst convened on 6 June 1997, and has met every month since.
Majority vote determines the rate of interest. Its remit, as dened in the Bank of England Act
(1998) is to "maintain price stability, and subject to that, to support the economic policy of Her
Majestys government, including its objectives for growth and employment."6 In practice, the
5We show that it cannot be the case, for example, that external members begin with a high degree of uncertainty
about how to vote, but gain more condence through time in their views and deviate from the internals.
6"The Bank of England Act came into e¤ect on 1 June 1998. The Act states that in relation to monetary
policy, the objectives of the Bank of England shall be:
(a) to maintain price stability, and
(b) subject to that, to support the economic policy of Her Majestys Government, including its objectives for
growth and employment.
In order to comply with the Act, this remit sets out what price stability shall be taken to consist of and what
the economic policy of the Government shall be taken to be."
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committee seeks to achieve a target ination rate of 2%, based on the Consumer Price Index7 .
If ination is greater than 3% or less than 1% the Governor of the Bank of England must write
an open letter to the Chancellor explaining why. The ination target is symmetric; missing the
target in either direction is treated with equal concern.
The MPC has nine members; ve of these come from within the Bank of England: the
Governor, two Deputy Governors, the Chief Economist, and the Executive Director for Market
Operations. The Chancellor also appoints four members (subject to approval from the Treasury
Select Committee) from outside the Bank. There are no restrictions on who can serve as an
external member. According to the Bank of England, the purpose of external appointments is
to "ensure that the MPC benets from thinking and expertise in addition to that gained inside
the Bank of England." Bar the governors, all members serve three year terms; the governors
serve ve year terms. When membersterms end, they can either be replaced or re-appointed.
Through August 2007, 25 di¤erent members have served on the MPC 11 internal members
and 14 external members. Each member is independent in the sense that they do not represent
any interest group or faction. The Bank encourages members to simply determine the rate of
interest that they feel are most likely to achieve the ination target - "The MPCs decision is
made on the basis of one-person, one vote. It reects the votes of each individual member of the
Committee" (Bank of England website).
The MPC meets on the rst Wednesday and Thursday of each month. In the month between
meetings, members receive numerous briengs from Bank sta¤ and regular updates of economic
indicators. On the Friday before MPC meetings, members gather for a half-day meeting in which
they are given the latest analysis of economic and business trends. On the Wednesday of the
meeting, members discuss their views on several issues. The discussion continues on Thursday
morning; each member is given some time to summarise their views to the rest of the MPC, and
suggest what vote they favour (although they can, if they wish, wait to hear the others views
before committing to a vote (Lambert, 2006)). This process begins with the Deputy Governor
for monetary policy, concludes with the Governor, and other members are selected at random
order in between. To formally conclude the meeting, the Governor suggests an interest rate
that he believes will command a majority. Each member then chooses whether to agree with
the Governors decision, or dissent and state an alternative interest rate. The MPC decision is
announced at 12 noon. Two weeks after each meeting, membersvotes are published, along with
minutes of the meeting with full, but unattributed comments.
In the analysis below, we take for granted that there is transparency of voting behaviour of
MPC members and MPC meeting minutes are published; without such a design structure, the
nature of our empirical work would be impossible. As a result our paper is not contributing to
general discussion of whether having a committee inuences monetary policy outcomes (inter-
ested readers are pointed toward Sibert (2006), Sibert (2003) and the references therein), or on
the debate about optimal degree of transparency (see, for example, Geraats (2006) and Sibert
(2002)).
Our main ndings on the voting behaviour of MPC members (described above) can be cate-
gorised as two static results (on average, internals vote for higher rates and their voting is more
bunched), and a dynamic results (these average di¤erences in behaviour are driven by external
members changing their behaviour after a period on the MPC). While other papers have exam-
ined the voting behaviour of individual MPC members, and described similar static patterns,
ours is the rst to establish the dynamic one. Gerlach-Kristen (2003) looks at the basic de-
scriptive data of MPC voting; Spencer (2007) focuses on the likelihood of a particular member
dissenting from the group with their vote and nds, similarly to Gerlach-Kristen (2007), that
7This target changed from RPIX to the CPI measure of ination in January 2004, with a reduction in the
ination target from 2.5% to 2%.
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externals deviate more often; Bhattacharjee and Holly (2005, 2006) nd evidence of heterogene-
ity in individual MPC members monetary policy reaction function. Harris and Spencer (2006),
using an alternative econometric methodology to ours, nd a similar static distinction between
internals and externals voting patterns (internals vote more for on average higher rates and their
voting is more bunched). Contrary this evidence of systematic di¤erences between internal and
external members, Besley et al (2007) nd evidence of heterogeneity in voting behaviour, but
they do not nd evidence of systematic di¤erences in the reaction to forecasts of ination and
the output gap between internal and external members (nor academic/non-academic, or those
who previously worked in government policy).
Static heterogeneity alone is not especially surprising since members can have di¤erent views,
although it is unclear why externals and internals have di¤erent views controlling for individual
characteristics. The point is that the static results alone admit many explanations. However,
our dynamic result is an especially interesting empirical puzzle, because our model shows that it
is incompatible with an ideal voting model in which members have di¤erent views.
3 A Model of MPC Voting
In the universe of voting models one might want to test with MPC voting data, one clearly
stands out: one in which members vote optimally from the governments perspective. As we
have seen, the government gives members a clear mandate to focus on hitting the ination target.
So, in an ideal world, all members would seek to achieve this goal. Also, members would vote
independently, without suppressing their views for whatever reason. We model exactly this
situation in an environment where there is uncertainty both about future ination, and about
the correctness of each members way of processing information. In our model, members will
update their priors about both their own and other members approaches to interpreting the data
and they can use these updated views to implement optimal policy (minimising the loss function
from ination deviations). We do not necessarily claim that our model describes actual voting
behaviour, but rather provides a benchmark that we can use to judge the actions of committee
members. While simple, the model provides enough predictions to enable us to use MPC voting
data to examine whether observed behaviour is consistent with the governments ideal behaviour.
In other words, if members were only trying to maximise welfare, the models tells us how they
would behave as they learned new information. The key result of the model is that initial
di¤erences in opinion create voting heterogeneity not only initially, but throughout the voting
process, while on the other hand, if members begin with no initial di¤erences in philosophy, there
will never be any di¤erences in vote level.
3.1 Assumptions and Set-up
The rst element of the model is a distribution zt+h for future ination t+h conditional on
the interest rate rt and a stochastic state variable t that captures economic conditions at time
t. The restrictions on z are that it satises E [t+h] = g (rt) + t and V [t+h] = 2t <1. We
assume that g is known and that g0 (rt) < 0 for all rt. The t subscript refers to whatever point in
time rt must be chosen, while h is the horizon at which ination is relevant for members choosing
rt. For example, on the MPC, members generally consider the two-year horizon for ination
when setting rates8 . Assuming g is known while t is unknown implies that monetary policy
experts in our set-up are certain of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, but unsure
8Of course, the concept of exible ination-targetting allows the monetary authority to vary h depending
on the nature of the shock hitting the economy. In our model we focus on the xed horizon of 2 years which
dominates the discussion of policy making at the Bank of England.
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about the inationary pressures facing the economy. Thus everyone would agree that lowering
interest rates from r0t to r
1
t will increase expected ination by f
 
r1t
 f  r0t  but not on the level
of expected ination at the new rate r1t . While one could certainly introduce uncertainty into
some parameter of g, insider accounts suggest that in reality most disagreements on the MPC
are about economic conditions rather than the transmission mechanism9 . We take the state
variable t to be a rst order autoregressive process t = t 1 + "t where "t  N
 
0; 2"t

are
unobserved shocks to the economy that impact on ination.
We analyze a committee of two experts, although all results are directly generalizable to an
N -person committee. In every time period t, each member i votes for an interest rate rit that
solves
min
rit
E [t+h   jIit]2 (1)
where  is the ination target and Iit is the information set of person i at period t. This
objective function is close to that which the MPC members are instructed to consider according
to the Bank of England Act - it focuses rst and foremost on ination stabilization around the
target rate (as discussed above). An important assumption is that members do not condition
their votes on othersvoting behaviour; that is, we rule out strategic voting. Firstly, this provides
analytical tractability since we avoid dealing with a game whose structure and solution would
be quite complex. Secondly, the Bank directly encourages a one-person, one-vote philosophy.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, we cannot observe features of the voting process such
as voting order (which varies from meeting to meeting) that would be important for estimating
a strategic voting model.
In order to simplify later algebraic expressions, we make the non-essential assumption that
members begin voting at t = 1 knowing that 0 = 0. Prior to voting in period t, member i
observes a signal !it = b"t + i where b"t = "t + vt and vt  N  0; 2vt is independent across time
periods and i  N
 
i; 
2
i

is independent across members. The two components of !it are
meant to reect the two main components of membersinformation sets. First, prior to voting
members receive information from the data and from Bank sta¤ on the state of the economy,
which we capture with b"t. All members share this component of !it in common. We dene the
total variance of b"t to be b2"t.
Second, members have individually-specic ways of interpreting the data to form a judgement
about the magnitude of economic shocks. The member-specic parameter i captures this
process, and plays a crucial role in our model. We will refer to it as a members philosophy. It
reects the way in which a member interprets data to form an opinion about the inationary
pressures that have developed between meetings. For example, it could capture a members way
of weighting di¤erent economic indicators, view about the supply gap in the economy, or simply
a personal bias arising from a particular background like central banking, academia, or business.
The fact that i is stochastic (across members but not across time) implies that members are
unsure about whether their philosophy is correct, and that they are willing to adjust it as they
gain experience. However, we assume that member i believes i  N
 
0; 2i

, so that people
enter the committee believing that their philosophy is correct, even though this belief could be
incorrect10 .
Although we have ruled out strategic voting,11 we do not exclude all interactions between
9See Barker (2007), for example. In addition Bhattacharjee and Holly (2005), who nd heterogeneity in
estimated individual policy reaction functions for MPC members, argue that di¤erences in the way individual
members assimilate information supplied to them generate such di¤erences.
10Our model can easily account for perceived as well as unperceived biases. If member i believed that i had
a mean di¤erent from 0, then (s)he would simply adjust his signal downward accordingly.
11Bhattacharjee and Holly (2006) suggest that their results are evidence of strategic voting in the context of
our model, their results could be explained by two members with similar philosophies
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members. Indeed, there is ample time before voting for members to discuss and share their views
on the economy. We model this by allowing each members signal to be publicly observable by
the other member. We assume that member i believes that j  N


i
j ; 
2
i

where j is the
philosophy of member j 6= i. Thus, members can have incorrect, non-common priors on the
correctness of any one individuals philosophy. However, we impose the natural belief restriction
that 
i
j + 
j
i = 0 for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i. If member i thinks that member j sees the state of the
world with a systematic upward bias of x, then member j thinks that member i sees the world
with a systematic downward bias of x. In a sense, this assumption demands that the members
philosophical di¤erences be coherent.
With the model fully described, one can now specify Iit. First, prior to voting members
receive each others signals, and know the distributions of the non-philosophical components of
the signals, so that [t=1 f!1 ; !2 ; ; b"g is contained in Iit. Second, member i has initial beliefs
on the distribution of his own and the other members philosophies12 , so that his information set
contains
n

i
j ;
2
1;
2
2
o
. Note that the membersinformation sets are identical except in their
initial beliefs on the correctness of each others philosophies.
3.2 Optimal voting behaviour
We now turn to the solution of (1).
Proposition 1 rit satises g (r

it) + E [tjIit] = .
Proof.
E [t+h   ]2 = E

2t+h
  2E [t+h] + ()2
= V [t+h] + [E [t+h]]
2   2E [t+h] + ()2
= V [t+h] + [E [t+h]  ]2
By the law of iterated expectations
E [t+h] = Et [t+hjt] = Et [t+hjt] = g (rt) + E [tjIit]
and by the law of iterated variances
V [t+h] = E [V [t+hjt]] + V [E [t+hjt]] = 2 + V [tjIit]
so member i picks rit to minimize
2 + V [tjIit] + [g (rt) + E [tjIit]  ]2
so rit satises
2 [g (rit) + E [tjIit]  ] g0 (rit) = 0
which implies that g (rit)+E [tjIit]   = 0 since g0 < 0 globally. The second order condition
conrms that rit is a minimum:
2g0 (rit) g
0 (rit) + 2 [g (r

it) + E [tjIit]  ] g00 (rit) = 2g0 (rit) g0 (rit) + 0 > 0
12Member i also has knowledge of the other members beliefs about member is philosophy, but this information
is irrelevant for member is voting behavior, hence we exclude it from Iit.
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Both members agree on what the goal of the committee isto meet the ination target and
they have at their disposal one instrument for achieving thisthe interest rate. The above claim
establishes the intuitive result that the optimal interest rate for each member is the one that sets
the expected mean of the ination distribution equal to the ination target. This result holds for
all distributions of ination, not just symmetric ones. The only uncertain part of the expected
mean is the current state of the economy, so the voting problem is equivalent to the problem of es-
timating current economic conditions, which by assumption is an aggregate of all economic shocks
since the beginning of the committee. In algebra, E [tjIit] =
P=t
=1 
t E [" jIit]. Therefore,
all voting di¤erences between members arise as di¤erences in the estimation of economic shocks.
3.3 Voting heterogeneity
In this section, we explore the sources of voting heterogeneity among members. Given that the
only di¤erences among members are in initial disagreements in monetary policy philosophies,
a natural starting point is to explore the e¤ect of these di¤erences on voting behaviour. The
following proposition formalizes the impact of philosophical disagreements on voting behaviour.
The proof proceeds via three claims, with the economic intuition of the results provided after
the proofs.
Proposition 2 If 
1
2 =  
2
1 6= 0 then r1t 6= r2t 8t. Moreover, if r1t0 6= r2t0 for some t0 then

1
2 =  
2
1 6= 0.
Claim 3 if (x1; ::; xn)
0 are random variables with a joint normal distribution with mean vector
(1; :::; n)
0 and covariance matrix  =

11 12
21 12

where 11 is the variance of x1 and 22
is covariance matrix of (x2; ::; xn)
0, etc., then x1j fxjgnj=2  N
 
; 2

where
 = 1 +12
 1
22

(x2; ::; xn)
0   (2; ::; n)0

and
2 = 11   12 112 21
Proof. See Greene (2008), pages 871-2.
Claim 4
E [tjI1t] E [tjI2t] =
=tX
=1
t 

1 (E [1jI2tn fw1 ; w2g]  E [1jI1tn fw1 ; w2g])
+2 (E [2jI2tn fw1 ; w2g]  E [2jI1tn fw1 ; w2g])

(2)
where
i =
2"
b2" 1 (V [ijI1tn fw1 ; w2g]) 1b2" 1 + (V [1jI1tn fw1 ; w2g]) 1 + (V [2jI1tn fw1 ; w2g]) 1
Proof. Consider the problem of estimating E [" jI1t]. Because I1tn fw1 ; w2g is only cor-
related with " via correlation with 1 and 2, estimating E [" jI1t] is equivalent to estimating
E [" jw1 ; w2 ] given 1  N
 
tn11;tn 
2
1

and 2  N
 
tn12;tn 
2
2

where tn11 = E [1jI2tn fw1 ; w2g]
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and tn21 = V [1jI1tn fw1 ; w2g] and likewise for tn12 and tn22. By Claim 3 we have that
E [" jI1t] =
2"
b2" 1  tn21 1b2" 1 +  tn21 1 +  tn22 1
 
!1  tn 11

+
2"
b2" 1  tn22 1b2" 1 +  tn21 1 +  tn22 1
 
!2  tn 12

The result follows directly.
Claim 5 For 1    t and i = 1; 2, E [ijI2tn fw1 ; w2g] E [ijI1tn fw1 ; w2g] = 
 
2i   1i

where 0 <   1.
Proof. We proceed by induction to show that E [1jI2tn fw11; w21g]   E [1jI1tn fw11; w21g] =



2
1   
1
1

for all t where 0 <   1. For t = 1 we have
E [1jI21n fw11; w21g]  E [1jI11n fw11; w21g] = 21   
1
1:
By the inductive hypothesis suppose that t 1n121 t 1n111 = 


2
1   
1
1

and that t 1n122 t 1n1
12 = 
0


2
2   
1
2

for some 0 < ;0  1. Now consider E [1jI2tn fw11; w21g]. Because the
random variables !1t and !2t are independent of those in I2t 1n fw11; w21g conditional on , one
can take f (1jI2t 1n fw11; w21g) as the prior distribution of 1 for person 2 and only use !1t and
!2t to estimate E [1jI2tn fw11; w21g]. By Claim 3, therefore
E [1jI2tn fw11; w21g] = t 1n121 +
b2"t 1 +  t 1n122 1b2"t 1 +  t 1n121 1 +  t 1n122 1
 
!1t  t 1n1 21

 
 
t 1n122
 1b2"t 1 +  t 1n121 1 +  t 1n122 1
 
!2t  t 1n1 22

so that
E [1jI2tn fw11; w21g]  E [1jI1tn fw11; w21g]
=
2641 
b2"t 1 +  t 1n122 1b2"t 1 +  t 1n121 1 +  t 1n122 1
37521   11
+
264  t 1n122 1b2"t 1 +  t 1n121 1 +  t 1n122 1
3750 22   12
= 
2
1
2664 

1  (b2"t) 1+(t 1n122) 1
(b2"t) 1+(t 1n121) 1+(t 1n122) 1

+0 (t 1n1
22)
 1
(b2"t) 1+(t 1n121) 1+(t 1n122) 1
3775
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where we have used the fact that 
1
1 = 
2
2 = 0 and 
2
1 =  
1
2. One can verify that the term in
brackets is between 0 and 1 given that  and 0 are as well. This completes the proof for the
case of i = 1 and  = 1. The rest of the cases work in identical fashion.
Proof. (of Proposition 2). Combining Claims 4 and 5 gives the result.
The main result of Proposition 2 is that initial di¤erences in opinion create voting hetero-
geneity not only initially, but throughout the voting process. Although members adjust their
philosophies as they gather more information from the Bank and from each other, they never
attain full agreement in nite time if there is initial disagreement. On the other hand, however,
if members begin with no initial di¤erences in philosophy, there will never be any di¤erences in
vote level. This quite strong result could be relaxed if we allowed some imperfect communication
of signals, in which case there would be no di¤erences in expected vote level rather than actual
vote level. However, the result that groups with no systematic divergence in initial voting should
show no systematic divergence in later voting actually holds in more general frameworks as well,
for example one in which members receive a person specic shock in their signal.
From Claim 3, one can see that member 1s estimate of "t given I1t is simply a weighted
average of the elements of the information set, so that
E ["tjI1t] = 11

!11   11

+ 21

!21   12

+ :::+ 1t

!1t   11

+ 2t

!2t   12

where the weights it come from inverting the covariance matrix of the vector
(!11; !21; :::; !1t; !2t)
0 .
Because there is common knowledge of the variance elements of their signals, members 1 and 2
agree on the weights. The only scope for disagreement comes from the priors they have on the
means of each others signals. If they are in agreement about these, then in every time period
their estimates of the economic shocks will be exactly equal.
Corollary 6 Heterogeneity in the precision of di¤erent members signals does not generate het-
erogeneity in voting behaviour of members.
Suppose member 1 has a very large 21 compared to 
2
2 and b2"1, and that 21 = 12 = 0. This
means that the 1 will be much smaller than 2 for any time period  ; since the informational
content of person 1s signal is much less than that of person 2s, it has less inuence in estimation.
Now, suppose we hold 22 and b2"1 xed in this setting, but replace 21 with e21 < 22, so that
now person 1s signal is more precise than person 2s. The e¤ect is that 1 will be larger than
2 for any time period  . But as long as 
2
1 = 
1
2 = 0, the voting levels of the members will not
diverge.
This example shows that the results in the empirical section cannot arise from a model in
which new external members follow the majority because they initially lack condence, but later
break away from the more experienced central bankers as they clarify their views and gain more
condence; in an ideal world, the unsure MPC member best serves society by revealing his or
her less precise signal and allowing other, more precise views to have a larger weight in his or
her nal decision. If members vote the same initially, it is because they have a similar view on
the world; even if one member is extremely rm in his beliefs, and the other is shaky, as long as
they agree on them, they will not begin to disagree at some later point.
3.4 From Theory to Data
Our model characterizes voting behaviour with two moments: mean and variance. Accordingly,
we can use data on the voting records of MPC members to explore patterns in voting levels and
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dispersion. However, any results on member di¤erences will not shed light on the validity of our
model, as these are exactly the kinds of di¤erence it admits. The predictions on the time path
of disagreement does provide a clear way to possibly reject our model. If members start voting
for similar interest rates and continue to do so forever, or if members vote for di¤erent interest
rates initially and gradually coverage, we cannot reject our model; if they do not do either, then
we can. The value added of our model is thus the ability to not only describe di¤erences in
voting behaviour, but to identify what can and cannot underlie them.
4 Econometric Analysis
4.1 Data
We use a complete history of MPC voting records between July 1997 and August 2007 (data
available from the Bank of England website). This contains a record of every decision (decisiont)
taken by the MPC, as well as each members vote (voteit = ri;t). Before June 1998 there is
information about whether members preferred higher or lower interest rates compared with the
decision, but not about their actual preferred rate. In these cases, we treat a members vote as
either 25 basis points higher or lower than the decision, in the direction of disagreement. The
Bank website also provides information on which members were external appointments and which
were internal. For every member we gathered biographical information, including previous occu-
pation, educational background, and age from press releases associated with their appointment
and from their returns to the Treasury Select Committee ahead of their conrmation.
For technical reasons, we drop the emergency meeting held after September 11th from our
dataset, but since this meeting was unanimous in its decision (to lower interest rates) it would
not be used for econometric identication in any case given our use of time xed e¤ects. Howard
Davies served on the MPC for the rst 2 meetings and is the only member who voted exclu-
sively on unanimous committees and thus his inclusion/exclusion is unimportant for econometric
identication; we include him in our baseline regressions. Lord George, the Governor in the
majority of our sample, always voted with the majority regardless of his starting position; as a
result we think that these voting records do not represent his own views in all cases. Even under
the governorship of Mervyn King, the Governor has only deviated twice since taking o¢ ce in
July 2003. Nonetheless, we include the observations for the Governor in the regression results
presented below, though all of the results stand if we exclude the data on the Governor at each
meeting.
In Table 1 we provide summary statistics of the individual members on the MPC. Of the 25
MPC members that we consider in our sample, 14 are external and 11 are internal as indicated
by the variable13 :
INTi =

0 if member i is an external member
1 if member i is an internal member
The average vote shows the mean of all votes cast by the member during their time on the MPC
within our sample; this is obviously driven largely by when a member served their time on the
committee. The variance column reports the analogous 2nd moment for the voting data. Table
1 shows that the educational background of both groups is mixed (a similar dispersion exists if
we look at previous career background, and whether each member worked as an academic prior
to their appointment (acadi = 1): It is also clear from Table 1 that each group contains members
who deviate more and less often from the majority. However, the tendency is clearly for external
13No member has so far served as both an external member and an internal member, though there is nothing
that prohibits this from happening in the future.
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members to deviate more often than internal members, and for them to vote for a rate lower
than the majority (with the notable exceptions of Sentance and Besley). Di¤erences along these
lines have already by pointed out in Gerlach-Kristen (2003). One of the goals of this paper
is to establish whether they stand up to formal econometric testing, controlling for observable
variables.
That there are numerous disagreements within the MPC is not surprising given the uncer-
tainties involved in setting interest rates. Although only 14% of total votes casts di¤er from
the majority of votes casts that period, 64% of the 122 meetings in our sample have at least 1
deviation. Figure 1 shows the level of interest rate chosen by the MPC, where the + signs that
are o¤ the main line indicate deviations from the majority. These deviations occur regularly and
not just around turning points in the interest rate cycle.
As noted in the theory section, the dependent variables of interest are voting levels and
dispersion. To measure the latter there are numerous options, including the squared deviation
from the average vote in each time period (ri;t rt)2, squared deviation from the committees
decision (ri;t   rdect )2, or the squared deviation from the average external or internal vote
(ri;t  rtgroup)2. All of these measure the dispersion of member i from the group, thereby
capturing the underlying variance of his voting behaviour. In practice, these three measures are
highly correlated (with correlation coe¢ cients above 0.9), so although we use the rst measure
in our main regressions, replacing it with either of the others would not change our results.
4.2 Econometric Model
While Table 1 suggests that the external members deviate from the committee more often, and
are more volatile in their voting behaviour, it is clear that these unconditional statistics do not
properly account for the fact that members serve their terms at di¤erent times during which
more or less deviations may take place. In order to establish the behaviour of voting in a more
robust way, we move to a regression framework. A key element in our model is the use of time
xed-e¤ects. Therefore we estimate the model in equation (3) using OLS14 .
yit = + :ageit + :zi + :INTi +  :T imet + :Qt + "it (3)
where:
 yit is the outcome variable of interest;
 ageit is the age of member i at time t;
 zi are time-invariant individual characteristics;
 INTi is the internal dummy variable dened earlier;
 Timet is a dummy variable which is 1 in period t and zero otherwise (month xed e¤ect);
 Qt is a quarterly dummy which takes the value 1 for each of the 3 months within each
particular quarter, and zero otherwise.
The implication of the inclusion of these dummies is the elimination of any variables that
vary only across time and not across individuals (zt), and it ensures that identication in this
equation comes from those months in which there was a deviation by at least one member of
14Although our data is categorical (in 25bp devisions) we proceed using OLS. Use of multinomial logit estimation
is not feasible with 7 distinct groupings in our sample (and theoretically more).
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the MPC. An alternative was to include data on ination and GDP, as well as the information
that comes from Bank of England quarterly forecast meetings as controls; this approach does not
alter the conclusions of our work. These time e¤ects are necessary to control for the business
cycle and other economic trends that a¤ect voting behaviour.
We do not include member xed e¤ects because the variable of interest in (3) is the inter-
nal dummy, which is a time-invariant individual characteristic. Fixed e¤ects would not allow
estimation of the  coe¢ cient since it does not vary through time. However, in the regressions
in which we interact INTi with a time-varying dummy we do show that our results are robust
to the inclusion of member xed e¤ects15 . As a further robustness check, we also include a
committee composition dummies in some regressions16 ; in other words, for each unique collec-
tion of committee members we create a dummy variable, and include this set of variables as a
control. This is potentially important if a members vote is a¤ected by the identity of the other
committee members.
We allow the errors to be clustered by MPC member; it is unlikely that members errors
are independent across time periods, especially if there is some systemic heterogeneity in the
voting rules that members use. Clustering corrects the standard errors of the estimates for
this correlation making it less likely that we wrongly fail to reject a null hypothesis of coe¢ cient
signicance. However, we also show that our results are unchanged without the clustering option.
To measure the e¤ect of being an internal versus being an external on voting behaviour, we
need to ensure that the variable of interest is not capturing the e¤ects of another variable which
is correlated the INT dummy variable. As a result we include a set of controls for obvious
confounders. The regressions include controls for those who were from the private sector (early
career control), education, and age, in addition to the INT dummy variable. Education is one
if the member has a masters degree or PhD and zero otherwise (the e¤ect of the two kinds
of degrees was similar in the regressions, so we combine them). Of course, there could still be
member heterogeneity that these biographical variables do not capture. However, given that any
study that attempts to estimate the e¤ect of being an external member in a regression framework
cannot use member xed e¤ects, one can never be one hundred per cent sure of the consistency of
the OLS estimates. If the regressors are independent of the error term, then the OLS estimates
from equation (3) will be consistently estimated.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Static voting patterns
The regressions using voteit(= ri;t) as the dependent variable are reported in Table 2. In
column (1), only time xed-e¤ects and the INTi variables are included, with standard errors
clustered on members; it is clear that internal members vote on average for higher interest
rates (+3.5bps). This result is robust to the inclusion of quarter xed-e¤ects (Column (2)) and
committee xed-e¤ects (Column (3)). In Column (4) we include a number of the other regressors
such as the members age, whether they were previously academics, and their education; none
of these are statistically signicant, although the coe¢ cient on the variable of interest drops
slightly (+2.8bps) but remains signicant at the 5% level. As expected, not taking account of
15An alternative to this approach is to use xed e¤ects in the regressions, and then to examine the whether the
estimated xed e¤ects are correlated within particular groups.
16Committee xed e¤ects require inclusion of a seperate 0-1 dummy variable for every di¤erent committee
composition that has met. Therefore, if a member leaves the committee and is replaced by a new member, this
represents a new committee composition and so a new dummy variable. Also, if a member is absent and so only
8 members meet in a particular month, then this committee composition is also di¤erent and so controlled for
seperately.
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the clustered errors compresses the standard errors, although there is no change in the estimated
coe¢ cients (Column (5)).
This di¤erence is considerable. Consider the counterfactual of switching an average external
member for an average internal member and holding other factors equal. Given the convention
of expressing votes in 25 basis point increments, the swing member will vote for no change ifbr   12:5 < r  br + 12:5, a raise of 25 basis points if br + 12:5 < r  br + 37:5, etc. This would
mean that the internal vote would, ceteris paribus, be for higher interest rates 11% more of the
time17 .
Table 3 examines the dispersion of these votes within time periods. We repeat the analysis
of the above 2 paragraphs using (ri;t rt)2 as the dependent variable measuring vote hetero-
geneity (although we exclude the results without clustering in the interests of space). Both age
and the higher education are statistically signicant; older members in general vote in a more
tightly packed bunch, while members with postgraduate degrees deviate further from the group
mean than do their less educated counterparts. In this case however we nd that the group
of internals vote more like the average of the committee. This is not capturing the fact that
externals deviate more often; as a group they deviate more often but also in a more dispersed
manner. To assess the magnitude of this e¤ect, consider Column (4) of Table 3: the average
deviation in the committee is 0.008 (it is small because it is a measure of variance), and the e¤ect
of being internal is to reduce this deviation by 0.005, or by 70%.
4.3.2 Dynamic voting patterns
Our regressions so far indicate that being an external or internal member matters for voting
levels and variance, not because of any education, age, or career di¤erences, but because of some
other factor specic to being external or internal. While one might wonder why being an external
or internal should matter for ones vote, these nding alone do not allow us to comment on the
validity of our voting model. In order to test it, we need to establish what is the time trend
of voting behaviour; that is, whether there are initial disagreements maintained through time,
or whether some group breaks away from another at some stage. To do this, we introduce a
dummy variable measuring experience:
expit

= 0 if the member is in their rst 12 months on the committee
= 1 otherwise
In Table 4 we present the regression results from the following equation:
yit = + :ageit + :zi + 1:INTi + 2:expit + 3: (INTi:expit) +  :T imet + :Qt + "it (4)
In Columns (1) and (2), we simply add the experience variable as an additional control to our
previous regressions; in both cases, the experience variable is statistically signicant. Experience
is associated with a lower level of vote and more dispersion. But in both cases, the e¤ect
of being an internal member is unchanged. To see whether experience inuences the voting
behaviour of internals and externals in di¤erent ways, we next include interaction terms in our
original regressions. These are reported in Columns (3) - (6); in the last 2 columns we include
member xed e¤ects18 . In column (7) we replicate the xed-e¤ects regressions of column (6),
17This assumes that the true desired interest rate is continuously distributed so that when the interest rate that
the external votes for is 10bps (no change given 25bp convention), the internal would vote for 10+2.8bps which
is a 25bp change. The gure of 11% follows from

2:8
25

:
18 In the xed e¤ects regressions, we exclude the age variable as it becomes a person specic trend when it is
de-meaned. However, the results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar with its inclusion.
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but use as the dependent variable the squared deviation of each members vote from their group
(internal/external) mean vote for period t.
The results in terms of voting levels are striking. In Column (3) the e¤ect of being an
internal is no longer signicant, but the e¤ect of being experienced is highly signicant and
large in magnitude ( 6 bps lower on average). Moreover, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term
is also large in magnitude (+6 bps higher on average) and highly signicant; thus, the e¤ect
of experience is di¤erent for internals and externals. Experience by itself leads people to vote
for lower rates, but this is driven entirely by the external members; it is not possible to reject
the hypothesis that internal members do not change their vote once they become experienced.
It therefore seems that neither inexperienced nor experienced internals vote for di¤erent rates
on average. This implies that although inexperienced externals do not behave any di¤erently
than inexperienced internals, experienced externals vote for systematically lower interest rates on
average. This nding is also robust to xed e¤ects panel data estimation, although the magnitude
and signicance of the coe¢ cient on experience is reduced (Column (5)).
Of course the choice of 12 months is rather arbitrary; we have repeated the analysis using
alternative measures such as 6, 9 and 18 month dummy variables, as well as a trending variable
over the rst 12 months19 . In fact, though the use of a 9 month dummy is most signicant,
we feel that 12 months is less arbitrary - 13 of the term for non-Governor-internal and external
members.
In addition, this result is not driven by the rst year of the MPC process (when everyone was
new). Repeating the regression in Columns (3) and (5), but dropping the rst 2 years of MPC
meetings, yields the same results.
To summarize, we nd that:
1. External members vote for, on average, lower interest rates;
2. and external members votes are more dispersed than those of internals.
3. The voting level di¤erences are driven entirely by experienced external members - when
they rst start on the MPC, external and internal votes are statistically the same.
5 Discussion
5.1 Consistency with ideal behaviour
Our ndings that external members are more dovish and more dispersed compared with internals
is established more robustly than in previous literature, but taken by themselves they are not
enough to comment one way or the other on what drives voting behaviour. However, our third
nding is much more useful for distinguishing among theoretical possibilities. In particular,
we can use it to reject the model of ideal voting behaviour presented above. If one assumes
that members are behaving according to the governments wishes, the fact that new externals
and internals come into the committee and vote for statistically equivalent interest rates means
they have equal priors on the bias of each others signal. Exposure to increasing amounts of
information should not drive Bayesian agents apart, and yet our econometric results show that
after being on the committee for some given amount of time, externals separate from internals
and vote for systematically lower interest rates. Moreover, our model is merely illustrative; we
believe that any reasonable model with Bayesian learning and ideal behaviour assumptions could
not explain the patterns in the data. This nding is quite important because it indicates the
19Results available on request.
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presence of an agency problem on the MPC. Experts make interest rate decisions on behalf of
the government, but at least the current structure of the MPC does not commit members to use
their information to maximize the governments objective function. Our results show evidence
that members indeed do not do so, resulting in a welfare loss to the government.
One can also evaluate whether the observed results are consistent with the models predictions
on voting variability. As members form more and more precise estimates of their bias, their
voting should become less variable. Columns (2) and (6) might at rst glance appear to present
another violation of ideal behaviour voting model, since experience is associated with greater
variability in voting behaviour. At this point, however, our choice of (ri;t   rt)2 as the
measure of voting heterogeneity becomes problematic. Since we have established that externals
and internals begin voting for similar interest rates and then diverge from each other, experience
will create a higher average deviation from the committee mean even if neither internals nor
externals become more variable in their voting. In order to address this concern, we rerun
the regression of column (6) (Table 4) using (ri;t  rtgroup)2 as the dependent variable and
report the results in columns (7)20 . In column (7), the coe¢ cient on the experienced dummy
is insignicantly di¤erent from zero (indicating that experience does not a¤ect the variance
of external members around their group mean). Moreover, the sum of the experienced and
interaction dummies (though positive) is insignicant (p-value 0:175); this provides evidence
that internals do not in fact become less variable as a group with experience.
Thus there is little evidence that voting becomes less variable with experience. There are
two ways to interpret this result. First, it could be further evidence that voting behaviour is not
consistent with ideal behaviour if members fail to rene their views on the state of the world.
A second possibility, however, is that there are other factors besides uncertainty on  terms that
create voting heterogeneity, such as member and time specic noise in observed signals, or noise
in the communication process. If this noise is persistent, then our econometric model might not
identify learning e¤ects if they are masked by the other sources of noise. At the very least one
can conclude that learning is not an important element in inuencing voting heterogeneity.
5.2 Signalling
If we are going to reject the model of ideal voting behaviour, a natural question to ask is what
model we need to use in its place. A related issue is whether internals or externals (or both)
are the group whose voting diverges from ideal behaviour. One possibility is that members not
only want to maximize (1), but also want to signal their competence or preferences through their
voting record. In other words, committee members may have career concerns. For example,
internals may want to signal to the government and to the central banking community that they
are tough ination ghters. Externals, who face more uncertainty about their future prospects
after their terms end, may want to signal to future employers that they are competent economists,
or that they have business friendly views. This section examines the credibility of these stories.
To test whether signalling drives the divergence in voting levels between externals and in-
ternals that arises with experience, a natural approach is to divide internals and externals,
respectively, into groups for which reputational considerations should play varying roles and to
see whether these di¤erent groups display the same divergence as they gain experience21 . If
they do, then signalling is not a convincing factor in explaining our results, while if they dont,
it cannot be ruled out. We consider two partitions of internals and externals into groups with
20Repeating the results for column (4) using (ri;t   rtgroup)2 as the dependent variable yields similar
conclusions.
21We have also carried out the same analysis for the variance of voting behaviour; these results are not included
as the variance results are less puzzling than the level results, but are available on request.
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varying career concerns. First, among internals and externals there are substantial numbers of
academics and non-academics. Because of the tenure system, one could argue that academics
should have less of a need to signal since they have a stronger outside option should they fail to
build a good reputation. In order to test whether non-academics and academics di¤er in voting
behaviour, we run the following regression:
yit = + :ageit + :zi + 1:INTi + 2:expit + 3: (INTi:expit) + 4:Acadi
+5: (Acadi:expit) + 6: (Acadi:INTi) +  :T imet + :Qt + "it. (5)
Rather than discuss the values of the coe¢ cients themselves, which are presented in Table 5
(column (1) without xed e¤ect, and column (2) with xed e¤ects), it is easier to discuss the
sums that represent the total e¤ect of taking on a particular set of characteristics. For example,
the total e¤ect of being an internal, experienced non-academic is 1 + 2 + 3 and the e¤ect
of being an experienced, external academic is 2 + 4 + 5. The relevant sums are listed in
the coe¢ cient column of Table 6; the other columns give information on testing whether these
sums are signicantly di¤erent from 0. Of course, what we are interested in is not whether
these sums are signicantly di¤erent from 0, but whether academics and non-academics have a
similar time path of votes. To this end, we test whether (1)=(2)=(3)=(4)=(5)=(6) in Table 6
and nd that one cannot reject this hypothesis (F (5; 23) = 0:43; P rob > F = 0:8260). On the
other hand, one can reject (1)=(2)=(3)=(4)=(5)=(6)=(7)=(8) (F (7; 23) = 5:99; P rob > F =
0:0005) but not (7)=(8) (F (7; 23) = 5:99; P rob > F = 0:0005). These results imply that all
internals and inexperienced externals vote for statistically equivalent interest rates regardless of
having previously been academics or not. Furthermore, academic and non-academic experienced
externals do not vote for signicantly di¤erent interest rates, but they do vote for signicantly
lower rates than other committee members.
One could of course argue that academics also have career concerns if they want future policy
roles, and that non-academics can also return to their previous jobs after their terms end since
time on the MPC presumably only boosts ones credibility in whatever profession one used to
work. We therefore present another test of career concerns. The Act that created the MPC
allows for the reappointment of all members, internal and external. When the rst group
of externals and internals served on the MPC, they thus operated under the assumption that
reappointment to the committee was possible, although uncertainty still existed about how the
reappointment system would function. Then, on 18 January 2000, Willem Buiter wrote an open
letter to then Chancellor Gordon Brown that laid down forceful arguments for not reappointing
external members (Buiter, 2000). Whether or not this letter swayed Browns decision is unclear,
but he did not reappoint a single external member from the original group, even though some
were still among the most prominent monetary policy experts in the UK. A clear precedent was
set: external members would nd reappointment di¢ cult, most likely extremely so. All external
members served for only one term until February 2003 (almost 6 years since the rst MPC
meeting), when Brown unexpectedly reappointed Stephen Nickell to the MPC (HM Treasury,
2003). Since then, Kate Barker has also been reappointed twice.
If career concerns existed, one would expect di¤erent voting patterns between external mem-
bers serving from February 2000 to February 2003 and those serving at other times, since the
rewards to reputation presumably changed when reappointment was and was not possible. To
this end, we run the regression
yit = + :ageit + :zi + 1:INTi + 2:expit + 3: (INTi:expit) + 4:reappointit
+5: (reappointit:expit) + 6: (reappointit:INTi) +  :T imet + :Qt + "it, (6)
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where reappointit equals 1 for all internals, and for externals before February 2000 and after
February 2003; the results are reported in Table 5 (columns (3) and (4)). Again, sums of
coe¢ cients are more interesting then their raw values, and we report them in Table 7. As the
reappointit variable is picking up a time e¤ect (the tendency for higher rates during the three
years between February 2000 and February 2003), the relevant test is whether the di¤erence
between (5) and (7) di¤ers from the di¤erence between (6) and (8); that is, whether experienced
externals separate from internals whether or not they can be reappointed to the committee. In
fact, the di¤erence in di¤erences is insignicant (F (1; 23) = 0:65; P rob > F = 0:4294) which
again undermines the plausibility of career concerns.
Due to space constraints, we omit two other tests of career concerns we conducted, although
they are worth mentioning. Although understanding the time path of votes in a career concerns
model would require an explicit model, a distinct possibility is that behaviour would not be
constant through time. One might expect reputation to become more relevant as the end of
ones tenure approached. To test this idea, we ran a regression that replaced reappointit in
the above regression with near_end_termit that took the value 1 if committee member i was
within 6 months of ending his or her term at time t. Again, this variable added nothing to the
explanatory power of regression (4). Also, we separated out members by whether they served
3-year or 5-year terms (the latter group comprises the governor and deputy governors and the
former everyone else), and again found no signicance di¤erences.
Taken together, these results suggest that career concerns do not play a large role in MPC
voting (though they obviously cannot disprove the existence of career concerns). This nding is
of independent interest because papers such as Levy (2007) and Sibert (2003) have stressed the
theoretical consequences of career concerns in committee voting, and Meade and Stasavage (2008)
have uncovered patterns in the voting record of the FOMC that they interpret as identifying
career concerns. These papers largely focus on voting di¤erences when deliberation and voting
is transparent or secretive, a dimension on which we do not observe variation. Nevertheless,
the regressions in this section show that career concerns are not always present or are present
but muted. They also show that understanding when career concerns do and do not arise is an
important topic for further research.
5.3 Implications for Committee Design
Although we have not reached a conclusion about the correct model that underlies voting pat-
terns, our results do have clear implications for anyone charged with designing a monetary policy
committee. First, there are measurable di¤erences in the behaviour of internal and external
members, meaning that the inclusion of both on a committee has statistically signicant e¤ects.
If we had found no di¤erences between the groups, then the decision of whether or not to include
external members would perhaps not even be relevant. However as di¤erences do exist, this is
not a trivial matter22 .
Second, the fact that the governments objective function, in our model, is concave means
that the extra variability in the voting behaviour of external strictly lower social welfare; if
externals voted for the same average interest rate but with less dispersion government welfare
would strictly increase. Hence, at least in the context of our model, the only justication for
including external members must come from their choosing interest rates more accurately than
internal members.
22One caveat applies to our econometric results. Because we have not explicitly modelled (correctly) the
behavior of internals and externals, using our regression output to draw counterfactual conclusions is not justied.
Replacing the four external members with internal members in any given meeting might change the behavior of
the original ve internal members, depending on the nature of the equilibrium that prevails.
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Finally, governments should not assume that committee members behave optimally. Ac-
cording to our results, one can unambiguously reject a model in which all members optimally
aggregate information in order to maximize a quadratic loss function.
Of course, there are likely to be only three experienced external members on the MPC, and so
the likelihood that their lower votes actually cause the outcome of the MPC meeting to change is
small. Nonetheless, Gerlach-Kristen (2004) shows that markets observe, and react to, the MPC
voting record, and membersdissenting in the direction of lower rates can lower the yield curve
even if they do not swing the majority of committee members. Whether this lowering leads
to higher output and ination is subject to debate. Moreover, the welfare implications of such
outcomes is also not straightforward; for example, where the central bank is using equation (1) as
its loss function, but where social welfare also includes an output loss term23 , lower interest rates
without a knock-on e¤ect on ination or ination expectations might actually boost welfare.
Our results also show that herding does not arise in an environment in which experts take
decisions sequentially. Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Banerjee (1992), and Ottaviani and Soren-
son (2000) have shown that when experts have private signals about the state of the world and
take decisions one after the other, then in equilibrium experts can "herd," or ignore their private
information and follow those that voted before them, either because of reputational or optimal
decision making preferences. If anything, our results show the opposite. MPC members begin
with no disagreement whatsoever, and then after several rounds of voting begin to disagree. A
tempting explanation is that for some reason new members suppress their private information,
but then after time begin expressing themselves. If this were the case, a herding situation would
occur before experts had any access to othersviews, but then disappear once they did, in direct
contradiction to the aforementioned theoretical literature24 25 .
6 Conclusion
We have presented evidence of substantial behavioural di¤erences between external and internal
members of the MPC which suggests that at least one of the groups behaves in a suboptimal way
from the governments perspective. This systematic di¤erence between internals and externals
should be particularly surprising given the use of individual xed-e¤ects and given the fact that
internals are often appointed from very similar backgrounds to externals and, therefore, the two
groups di¤er only in the sense that the internals are appointed to the sta¤ of the Bank of England
and take on management responsibility.
In considering the advantages of external MPC members for the committee, our paper leaves
one major avenue unexplored. Though we focused on information in our paper, we have not mod-
elled explicitly a heterogeneous information processing and sharing approach. Perhaps external
members, with di¤erent perspectives, change the way internal members consider some issues or
interpret some of the data. For example, if the signals that members received were multidimen-
sional, and externals brought more precise information to the committee on certain dimensions,
then including them on the committee could increase government welfare even if externals were
23This world where the Central Bank only cares about ination is an extreme conservative central banker in
the world of Rogo¤ (1985).
24The voting sequence is from meeting to meeting, and in our model expertssignals about the period t shock
were not correlated with their signals about the period t+1 shock, so in fact herding or anti-herding would never
occur anyway. We could, however, have introduced correlation in the shocks without altering the results, and in
this case our model would be one in which herding could occur.
25 If experts do indeed hide their private information upon rst joining the committee, then allowing new
members to serve an apprenticeship during which they can learn about the MPC process without having to vote
for interest rates would be advisable, since supression of private information lowers social welfare.
18
no more likely to vote for the correct interest rate than internals. This is consistent with o¢ cial
views about the committee structure26 . Further research might address this topic.
Future research should also try to determine exactly what drives MPC voting behaviour
established in this paper in order to answer the question of whether or not external members
should have places on monetary policy committees. Similar work on the voting behaviour of other
central bank committees with published voting records may also contribute to the understanding
of this issue.
Nonetheless, this paper has provided a rst step in this direction and has established an
important, and puzzling, set of robust facts on the voting behaviour of the external members of
the MPC; they appear to initially behave like hard-nosed, ination ghting central bankers and
then, over time, vote for lower interest rates. The next step is to establish whether such delayed
dovishnessis a desirable feature of independent monetary policymakers.
26Two quotes from the Bank of England website capture these views:
"The desirability of having independent voices on the committee suggests that while professional
economists should have a strong representation, it is a good idea to have a number of members with
a di¤erent point of view. This helps to ensure that decision-making is not dominated by a rigid
consensus perspective."
"The appointment of external members is designed to ensure that the MPC benets from thinking
and expertise in addition to that gained inside the Bank of England."
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Table 1: Sample Statistics by Member
Member INTi Average Variance Education Acadi Meetings Total %
Vote of Vote Deviations Deviations
Andrew Sentance 0 0.18 0.014 Prof/PhD 0 11 4 36.4
Charles Goodhart 0 0.01 0.050 Prof/PhD 1 35 3 8.6
Christopher Allsopp 0 -0.13 0.020 Masters/Accountancy 1 36 10 27.8
David Blanchower 0 0.00 0.009 Prof/PhD 1 15 5 33.3
David Walton 0 0.00 0.023 Masters/Accountancy 0 12 3 25.0
DeAnne Julius 0 -0.12 0.036 Prof/PhD 0 45 13 28.9
Kate Barker 0 0.00 0.020 Undergraduate 0 75 5 6.7
Marian Bell 0 -0.01 0.018 Masters/Accountancy 0 36 5 13.9
Richard Lambert 0 0.02 0.013 Undergraduate 0 34 0 0.0
Sir Alan Budd 0 -0.06 0.070 Prof/PhD 0 18 4 22.2
Stephen Nickell 0 -0.05 0.028 Prof/PhD 1 72 17 23.6
Sushil Wadhwani 0 -0.11 0.041 Prof/PhD 0 36 12 33.3
Tim Besley 0 0.17 0.015 Prof/PhD 1 12 4 33.3
Willem Buiter 0 0.00 0.106 Prof/PhD 1 35 16 45.7
Charles Bean 1 -0.02 0.017 Prof/PhD 1 83 5 6.0
David Clementi 1 -0.04 0.034 Masters/Accountancy 0 60 4 6.7
Ian Plenderleith 1 -0.03 0.033 Masters/Accountancy 0 59 5 8.5
John Vickers 1 0.00 0.060 Prof/PhD 1 28 5 17.9
Mervyn King 1 0.02 0.027 Prof/PhD 0 122 14 11.5
Paul Tucker 1 0.05 0.012 Undergraduate 0 63 7 11.1
Rachel Lomax 1 0.04 0.008 Masters/Accountancy 0 50 5 10.0
Sir Andrew Large 1 0.07 0.016 Masters/Accountancy 0 40 9 22.5
Sir Edward George 1 -0.03 0.029 Undergraduate 0 72 0 0.0
Sir John Gieve 1 0.08 0.014 Undergraduate 0 19 1 5.3
Howard Davies 1 0.25 0.000 Masters/Accountancy 0 2 0 0.0
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Table 2: Regressions of MPC Voting Behaviour
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
voteit voteit voteit voteit voteit
INTi 0.035** 0.035** 0.035** 0.028** 0.028***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.006)
D(high education) -0.011 -0.011*
(0.014) (0.006)
D(private sector) -0.018 -0.018**
(0.014) (0.007)
Age -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
Month FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Committee FE? Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Residuals? Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Constant 0.229*** 0.229*** 0.120** 0.249*** 0.249***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.049) (0.040) (0.044)
Observations 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068
R2 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: Regressions of MPC Voting Behaviour - Variance of Votes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(ri;t  rt)2 (ri;t  rt)2 (ri;t  rt)2 (ri;t  rt)2
INTi -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
D(high education) 0.004**
(0.002)
D(private sector) -0.001
(0.002)
Age -0.000
(0.000)
Month FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE? Yes Yes Yes
Committee FE? Yes Yes
Clustered Residuals? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.003* 0.003* -0.009 0.008
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.005)
Observations 1068 1068 1068 1068
R2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.22
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Experience Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
voteit (ri;t  rt)2 voteit (ri;t  rt)2 voteit (ri;t  rt)2 (ri;t  rtgroup)2
INTi 0.033** -0.005*** -0.009 -0.006** - - -
(0.013) (0.002) (0.019) (0.002) (-) (-) (-)
D(high education) -0.013 0.005** -0.015 0.005** - - -
(0.013) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (-) (-) (-)
D(private sector) -0.017 -0.001 -0.017 -0.001 - - -
(0.013) (0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (-) (-) (-)
Age 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
expit -0.033** 0.003* -0.058*** 0.002 -0.029*** 0.003* -0.002
(0.014) (0.002) (0.018) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001)
INTi*expit 0.057*** 0.001 0.044*** 0.001 0.004**
(0.017) (0.003) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002)
Month FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Committee FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Residuals? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Member FE? Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.230*** 0.009* 0.260*** 0.009* 1.610*** 0.018 0.003
(0.039) (0.005) (0.040) (0.005) (0.255) (0.043) (0.034)
Observations 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068
R2 0.80 0.23 0.80 0.23 0.81 0.20 0.21
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Signalling Regression Results
(1) (2) (5) (6)
voteit voteit voteit voteit
INTi -0.010 - 0.022 -
(0.025) - (0.022) -
expit -0.042** -0.011 -0.068*** -0.043***
(0.020) (0.012) (0.019) (0.013)
acadi 0.012 -
(0.038) -
reappointit 0.228*** 0.153***
(0.042) (0.039)
INTi*expit 0.048*** 0.035*** 0.053*** 0.041***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012)
INTi*acadi 0.005 0.000
(0.028) (0.000)
expit*acadi -0.037 -0.042***
(0.026) (0.015)
INTi*reappointit -0.041** -0.009
(0.017) (0.013)
expit*reappointit 0.019 0.028
(0.023) (0.017)
Constant 0.253*** 1.596*** 0.061 1.521***
(0.047) (0.254) (0.049) (0.262)
Observations 1068 1068 1068 1068
R-squared 0.80 0.82 0.80 0.81
# of members 24 24
Member FE? NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include Month, Quarter and Committee FE
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Table 6: Academic and Experience Regressions - Main Coe¢ cients
Column Members Coe¢ cient Std. Error T-test P-Value
Internals
(1) New, non-academic -0.010 0.025 -0.430 0.674
(2) New, academic 0.001 0.057 0.020 0.983
(3) Experienced, non-academic -0.004 0.025 -0.180 0.862
(4) Experienced, academic -0.025 0.029 -0.850 0.404
Externals
(5) New, non-academic Baseline case
(6) New, academic 0.012 0.038 0.310 0.760
(7) Experienced, non-academic -0.042 0.020 -2.080 0.049
(8) Experienced, academic -0.067 0.030 -2.200 0.038
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Table 7: Possible Reappointment and Experience Regressions - Main Coe¢ cients
Column Members Coe¢ cient Std. Error T-test P-Value
Internals
(1) New, non-reappoint 0.022 0.022 1.000 0.328
(2) New, reappoint 0.209 0.034 6.210 0.000
(3) Experienced, non-reappoint 0.007 0.023 0.290 0.775
(4) Experienced, reappoint 0.213 0.037 5.720 0.000
Externals
(5) New, non-reappoint Baseline case
(6) New, reappoint 0.228 0.042 5.480 0.000
(7) Experienced, non-reappoint -0.068 0.019 -3.620 0.001
(8) Experienced, reappoint 0.179 0.039 4.530 0.000
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